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Introduction
Coined money was invented and introduced in the seventh century bc 
by the Lydians, a small people at the edge of Greek culture. They first 
created a currency of so-called electron, an alloy of gold and silver, 
mainly for local circulation within Western Asia Minor. From the sixth 
century bc, however, coinage as a means of economic exchange, mostly 
in silver, rarely in gold, was increasingly introduced by various Greek 
city-states in Asia Minor as well as in Central Greece, and soon after­
wards also among the daughter cities of Western Greece, in Sicily and 
Southern Italy. After its preliminary stage in Lydia, it was in the Greek 
world that coined money became the basis of economy in its most 
important aspects: payment and exchange, storing wealth, and measur­
ing value. Late archaic Greece was the first society with a considerably 
monetized economy.1 *
1 General introduction to Greek and Roman coinage: C. Howgego, Ancient History
from Coins, London: Routledge 1995; S. von Reden, Money in Classical
Antiquity, Cambridge University Press 2010. For a general theory of money, see 
the monumental work of K.-H. Brodbeck, Die Herrschaft des Geldes, Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 2009.1.owe this reference to Ulrich Duchrow.
The surprising fact about the origins of coined money is that they 
occurred not in one of the great empires of Mesopotamia or Egypt, 
with their monarchical structures and their unparalleled political and 
economic dominance, but in relatively small city-states without any 
firmly centralized political power. As is well known, in these so-called 
poleis there were neither firmly established rulers nor powerful priests 
who might have organized centralized economic structures, but a 
changing number of competing aristocratic families and an increas­
ingly self-confident middle class, the members of which seem to have 
been concerned mainly with the micro-economic issues of their 
Ill
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market, common festivals, etc., and on the other hand the polis sanc­
tuaries, serving communitarian religious rituals. In the old cities of the 
Greek mother-country the urban layout was determined by long periods 
of irregular growth, but the structural development, with an agora and 
one or more city sanctuaries, corresponded precisely with the “colo­
nies”. This structure can be defined as an egalitarian and reciprocally 
communicative system.4
4 For the urban structure of early poleis, see R. Martin, L’urbanisme dans la Grece 
antique., Paris: Oicard 1956, 75-96; E. Greco and M. Torelli, Storia 
dell’urbanistica: Il mondo Greco, Roma-Bari: Laterza 1983,65-148; T. Holscher, 
Offenthche Rdume in friihen griechischen Stddte, 2nd edn., Heidelberg: Winter 
1998; D. Mertens, Stddte und Bauten der Westgriechen, Munich: Hirmer 2006.
5 See recently von Reden, Exchange in Ancient Greece; B. Wagner-Hasel, Der Stoff 
der Gaben: Kultur und Politik des Schenkens und Tauschens im archaischen 
Griechenland, Frankfurt: Campus 2000, esp. 27-76 with a critical assessment of 
theories of gift.
6 Pre-monetary “media”: I. Strom, “Obeloi of Pre- or Proto-monetary Value in 
Greek Sanctuaries,” in: T. Linders and B. Alroth, Economics of Cult in the Ancient 
Greek World, Proceedings of the Uppsala Symposium 1990, Uppsala: 
Gustavianum 1992, 41-50; Seaford, Money and the Early Greek Mind, 102-24; 
Thesaurus Cultus et Rituum Antiquorum V, 2.b (2005) 329-33 (S. Th.
Schipporeit).
The typical form of economy in the first phase of polis culture, 
through the ninth to seventh centuries bc, was exchange trade and 
gift.5 There existed some general value units, like cattle or bronze 
tripods, and some pre-monetary means of pay, like iron spits (obeloi) 
or silver bullion,6 but their adoption must .have been difficult in differ­
entiated mercantile activities: they cannot have helped much more than 
to supplement and rationalize the prevailing practice of exchange. 
A crucial precondition in economic exchange was the basic incompat­
ibility of commodities and services: a fisherman who needs a boat 
acquires at one moment a precious object for which he can pay only 
later, and only in small quantities, with his daily yield of fish. In this 
sense, exchange trade is fundamentally asymmetrical, with short-term 
services on the one side and long-term obligations on the other. As a 
consequence, it is based strongly on personal reliability and mutual 
trust.
A specific form of economic exchange, typical of this phase, was gift 
and counter-gift. Gifts were given, and answered by counter-gifts, 
among the dominant chiefs as the basic symbols of long-term relations. 
This practice, too, was not based on one-to-one equivalence, but was 
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embedded in a comprehensive social system of dominance and depend­
ence, in which the folks provided their lord with supplies and commod­
ities, while the lord offered protection and justice to his followers. 
Exchange, therefore, was not immediate and piece-for-piece, but was 
a long-term interaction belonging to a systeme de prestations totalesJ
National economists like Karl Bucher, social historians like Marcel 
Mauss and Louis Gernet, classical historians like Moses I. Finley, 
recently followed by Sitta von Reden and Beate Wagner-Hasel, have 
insisted on this “embedded” social character of gift culture and 
exchange trade and the deeply rooted fiduciary and moral aspects of 
this system.7 8
7 M. Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies, 
trans. W. D. Halls, New York: W. W. Norton 1990 (orig. pub. 1925).
8 K. Bucher, Die Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft 1, Tubingen: Laupp 1893;
M. Mauss, “Essay sur le don: Forme et raison de 1’echange dans les societes 
archaiques,” in: L’annee sociologique n.s. 1 (1923/24) 30-196; M. I. Finley, The 
Ancient Economy, London: Chatto & Windus 1973; Wagner-Hasel, Der Stoffder 
Gaben, esp. 27-76.
On principle, the relationship of long-term exchange and mutual 
support was also the basis of the interrelation between gods and mortal 
men. Here, too, the gifts of men, veneration through rituals and sacri­
fices, and those of the gods, such as welfare, richness, and success, did 
not result from one-to-one negotiations; the traditional principle of “do 
ut des” was no trade transaction of goods, but was a reciprocal estab­
lishment of long-term confidence and support.
A second phase of the archaic Greek polis, beginning in the decades 
around 600 bc, was marked by an increasing consolidation of the entire 
body of citizens, in which the prosperous middle classes played an 
essential role. The main concern was to integrate the mighty aristocratic 
leaders politically and mentally into the citizens’ community, through 
efficient legislation based on reflection on the ethical and religious 
foundations of the polis. The effect was a considerable increase in 
civic coherence. It was in this period that the exigencies of economy 
within the community as well as the collective tasks of the citizen-body 
became more and more complex. However, there was no “state” insti­
tution, whether an individual monarch or a collective steering group, 
that had the power of organizing the community’s economy. In the 
Bronze Age palace systems the ruler had assumed the function of 
organizing the economic preconditions of great collective activities.
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Now, in the developed polis of the late seventh and early sixth centuries, 
there emerged again great challenging exigencies and tasks - for which, 
however, the structures of the polis state were insufficient. In this 
situation, new forms of economy were required.
The gradual development of “money” in seventh- and sixth-century 
Greece corresponds precisely to this new stage of social and economic 
life. The pre-monetary means of paying that hitherto were in use had a 
practical function as well as a symbolic significance which determined 
their value: cattle were the primary riches of agrarian societies; bronze 
tripods and iron spits might be adopted as cooking vessels and roasting 
instruments for meat at religious festivals; bullion of precious metal 
could be melted down and used for various purposes. There was not yet 
a difference between exchange of goods and payment of value.
The first issues of stamped coinage, the Lydian electron coins of the 
seventh and early sixth centuries bc, still seem to have been used in a 
sort of gift system, in “an intermediate stage between ‘pure’ exchange of 
goods and the development of all-purpose money”.9 Monetization of 
the market in its proper sense was only - partly - achieved in sixth­
century Greece. Even then, money economy did not replace the practice 
of exchange trade, but complemented the traditional system. 
Nevertheless, the new currency implied a historical change of great 
impact.
9 Price, “Thoughts on the Beginnings of Coinage,” 5-8; Kurke, Coins, Bodies,
Games, and Gold, 10 (quotation); Papadopoulos, “Minting Identity: Coinage,
Ideology and the Economics of Colonization in Akhaian Magna Graecia,” 41-2.
10 See (critically) Cook, “Speculations on the Origins of Coinage,” 259: “Most 
Classical students assume that coinage was invented to assist commerce ”. Contra, 
e.g. Kraay, “Hoards, Small Change and the Origin of Coinage.”
The immediate aims in the introduction of coined money
The decisive new step of coined money was that the state created an 
artificial system of economic exchange. Recent approaches to this phenom­
enon see the principal goal of this initiative in the aim of “the polis” to 
promote commerce and to control the economy:10 the community of 
the middle classes, as the core of the citizen-body, is conceived of as the 
initiator of an egalitarian system of short-term exchange by which the 
traditional elite system of long-term gift exchange was efficiently fought 
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against and ultimately superseded.11 In this sense, “coinage as a recom­
pense” is thought to have become a symbol of “the polis as an institution 
that controlled justice and prosperity”. And the traditional system of gift 
exchange, based on agrarian wealth and ancestral treasure, is seen as a 
concept referring to “a divine order of justice”, favoring the mighty clan 
leaders in their privileged positions, while “the introduction of coinage 
indicates a shift of authority over social justice from the gods to the 
polis”.12
11 Kurke, Coins, Bodies, Games, and Gold, 19-22; Papadopoulos, “Minting
Identity: Coinage, Ideology and the Economics of Colonization in Akhaian 
Magna Graecia,” 42-3.
12 von Reden, Exchange in Ancient Greece, 175.
13 On the absence of an abstract concept of “market” see Finley, The Ancient 
Economy, esp. 17-34.
14 Kraay, “Hoards, Small Change and the Origin of Coinage,” 76-85;
Papadopoulos, “Minting Identity: Coinage, Ideology and the Economics of 
Colonization in Akhaian Magna Graecia,” 40-1:
All this may in a higher sense be true. But it is difficult to imagine that 
such theoretical considerations corresponded to the explicit discourses 
and intentions of archaic Greek statesmen and citizens. Probably the 
introduction of coined money is one of the most striking cases of 
discrepancy between the concrete intentions of historical actors and 
the implicit consequences of their action. Both of these phenomena are 
highly relevant, but they should be kept and considered apart.
The state’s “promotion of economy” seems to be a rather abstract and 
anachronistic concept of economic theory: who, in this period, is the 
“state” that exerts control? What is “the economy” that is to be promoted? 
In which way is this “control” conceived? And for what immediate pur­
pose? It seems rather improbable that general concepts of “trade” and 
“market” were already in existence, and that specific structural measures 
were taken, aiming at steering “the economy”.13 As soon as one tries to 
substantiate such explanations, difficulties arise. On the one hand, trade 
with external partners does not seem to have been of primary importance 
for the introduction of a money economy.14 Far-distance trade had already 
been effectuated in similar dimensions in the Bronze Age and again increas­
ingly since the early Iron Age - without coined money. Carthage, with its 
powerful trade activities, did not coin money until the late classical period. 
In Greece, after the introduction of coinage, circulation was more-or-less 
confined to the issuing polis territory. Only in a few mighty poleis, like 
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Athens, and to some degree Aigina and Corinth, did far-distance trade 
develop more and more, and the distribution of their coins testifies impres­
sively how much this was facilitated by the new currency. But this was not 
the normal case. Therefore, the first motivation for the introduction of a 
money economy must be sought in new internal developments and exigen­
cies of the polis. Promotion of “trade” in general can hardly have been a 
major concern of those who introduced coined money.
Regarding the practical use of coinage, it has often been assumed that 
the denominations of early Greek coinage were too high for retail trade 
in local markets. Recent research, however, seems to suggest the exis­
tence of rather substantial quantities of fractional coinage. Thus, the use 
of coins in individual economic practice cannot be excluded.15
15 Howgego, Ancient History from Coins, 6-8.
16 Thus Finley, The Ancient Economy, 166. Contra: Martin, “Why did the Greek
Polis originally Need Coins?” 259-64.
Further questions arise regarding social and political explanations of 
coinage as an economic tool in favor of justice regarding the middle 
classes: did anybody intend or realize a direct connection between 
coinage and justice? Moreover, could anybody think of the possibility 
of shifting the authority of social justice away from the gods? Why, 
then, the overwhelming presence of divine images on Greek coins? 
Thus, if the aforementioned interpretations imply some higher truth, 
they probably do not correspond to the explicit intentions and aims but, 
rather, mark the inherent consequences and theoretical implications of 
early Greek money economy. Equally problematic are explanations of 
the introduction of money as expressions of a city-state’s sovereignty, 
autonomy, and identity.16 Apart from the question why so many city- 
states for a long time did without this means of self-assertion, it is 
difficult to imagine that a polls changed its entire economic behaviour 
out of a purely symbolic motivation. Thus, before reflecting on such 
abstract second-level issues, some simple considerations seem to be 
appropriate.
The basic goal of the introduction of coined money was probably 
much more concrete and circumscribed; for the “state” had not only a 
monopoly in issuing money and in controlling and granting its value, 
but must above all have been the first distributor and “user” of the new 
currency. Thus, obviously, the introduction of coined money must have 
served the exigencies of a new kind of public enterprise and expenses 
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which could no longer easily be fulfilled by the pre-monetary means of 
exchange. Since the first currencies, even in their smallest units, consist 
of relatively high values, coins must have served to recompense some 
precious commodity or long-term service. Because of their occasional 
application, coins seem not to have been issued with continuous regu­
larity, but in response to specific needs.17
17 Kraay, “Hoards, Small Change and the Origin of Coinage,” 320-8.
18 On financial practice and purposes of coinage in archaic Greek city-states, see
C. Starr, The Economic and Social Growth of Early Greece 800-500 B.C., New 
York: Oxford University Press 1977, esp. 97-117; Martin, “Why did the Greek 
Polis originally Need Coins?”
19 Hiring mercenaries as the purpose of early Lydian electron coinage: Cook, 
“Speculations on the Origins of Coinage,” 259-61. The examples of state 
financing of warfare cited by C. M. Kraay, “Greek Coinage and War,” in:
W. Heckel and R. Sullivan (eds.), Ancient Coins of the Graeco-Roman World: 
The Nickle Numismatic Papers,’Ontario: Wilfried Laurier University Press 1984, 
3-18, are all post-archaic.
20 In this sense, see Starr, The Economic and Social Growth of Early Greece 
800-500 B.C., 113; Martin, “Why did the Greek Polis originally Need Coins?” 
267-72. See also Seaford, Money and the Early Greek Mind, 75-87. In general on 
money in religious contexts, see von Reden, “Monetary Economy in the Greek 
World,” in: Thesaurus Cultus et Rituum Antiquorum vol. VIII (2012), 11-127.
Early Greek city-states fulfilled only few tasks for which public 
recompense of major volume had to be paid.18 Political and sacred 
administration was accomplished by members of the wealthy classes, 
equipment for the citizen’s army had to be provided by the citizens 
themselves, while the employment of mercenaries was a restricted prac­
tice in a restricted number of city-states.19 Higher state expenses regard­
ing warfare were probably needed for warships, the costs of which must 
have exceeded the possibility of private financing. Doubtless, however, 
the most expensive field of state projects was public building. Indeed, it 
was in the period of the late seventh and the sixth centuries bc that 
Greek cities were transformed through new devices of urban monumen- 
talization: the civic centres (agorai) were enlarged and equipped with 
public buildings, the main streets were paved, abundant water supply 
with pipelines was provided and water-houses were built, drainage 
systems were constructed, the urban settlements were encircled with 
mighty city walls. And above all, the great polls sanctuaries were 
provided with monumental and richly adorned temples, altars, porti­
coes, banquet halls, entrance buildings, some of them also with instal­
lations for athletic training and competition.20 Such constructions were 
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designed for the consolidated civic communities of this period, and they 
served public purposes which afforded additional financing by the polis: 
in particular, the great religious festivals with athletic and musical 
competitions, sacrifices, public meals and banquets which, besides the 
irregular efforts of building projects, constituted a high regular burden.
For all such projects, storage of financial resources and continuous 
payment to large numbers of workmen was necessary. In this regard, 
the traditional exchange economy did not constitute a sufficient basis; 
minted coinage was much better suited to fulfill these needs.
Precise chronological correspondence between the origins of coinage 
and urban monumentalization in stone is difficult to prove. Firstly, the 
emergence of monumental architecture occurred gradually, not in a 
definite step towards a higher level of monumentality; in addition, 
there are few cities where investigations give a comprehensive insight 
into this development. Within this change of urban centres there is no 
moment when the introduction of coined money became “necessary”: 
we can only determine periods when coining money became a plausible 
solution to increasing problems. On the other hand, dates of the origins 
of coining within the various Greek cities are still, within certain limits, 
controversial among numismatists.
With these precautions, some figures may be given as a framework for 
substantiating the interrelation between sacred architecture and 
coinage:
Coinage Temples
Ephesos 600 bc (electron), 540 bc 560 bc
Samos 7th century (electron), 530 bc 570-560 bc
Miletos 600-575 bc (electron) 550 bc (Didyma)
Athens 570-550 bc 580-560 bc
Aigina 580-560 bc 570 bc
Corinth 570-550 bc 540 bc
Taras/Tarentum 500 bc 560 bc
Metapontion 550 bc 570-560 bc
Poseidonia 530 bc 540 bc
Syracuse 530 bc 580 bc
Akragas 520-510 bc 530 (?) bc
Selinunt 520 bc 560-540 bc
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Obviously, in some places like Aigina, Corinth, or Athens, the origins of 
coinage occurred roughly at the same time or slightly earlier than 
monumental temple building; in Eastern Greek places like Ephesos, 
Samos, and Miletos, the monetary conditions had already existed for 
some decades, while in Western Greece cities like Taras, Syracuse, or 
Selinus started monumental temple building without coined money, 
and only later seem to have felt the need for supporting their great 
building programs with coinage of their own. All this, however, does 
not contradict the general interrelation between coinage and monumen­
tal urbanization, of which temple building was only one of several 
factors.
Generally speaking, not only was the society of the polis state a 
higher, second-level community, but also the common exigencies and 
tasks changed from the production for individual persons and families 
to the enterprises of and for the whole community.
Contrary to the great centralizing monarchies of ancient 
Mesopotamia and Egypt, with their powerful system of collecting and 
redistributing material goods, early Greek cities did not have a 
sufficient economic infrastructure in order to accomplish public enter­
prises of such dimensions. While formerly, individual craftsmen or 
workshops, busy with short-term production, were remunerated by 
individual customers, now the community had to pay great numbers 
of workmen for more-or-less long-term work. Remuneration in com­
modities would by far have exceeded the capacities of early Greek poleis 
with their yearly changing non-professional magistrates. To cope with 
such problems, a means was created by which the property of the 
community could be accumulated, stored and paid out in small units 
to individual persons according to their individual quantity of labour. 
Thus, it was the specific lack of political power and the infrastructural 
weakness of Greek poleis that was the basis of the introduction of a 
money economy. Instead of the powerful organization of redistribution, 
a slim system of “abstract” payment was installed. On the other hand, 
this makes it clear why a money economy did not spread out through 
the Near East and Egypt: there, under the conditions of hierarchical 
monarchic power, public labor and exchange were differently organ­
ized; there was no market in which free convertibility of coined money 
was needed.
For the recipients, payment by money must soon have become attrac­
tive. Whereas in the traditional exchange arid gift culture the recompense 
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depended on the specific goods that one’s partner could offer, money was 
a completely abstract potential, allowing conversion of labor or com­
modities into all kinds of goods, in any place and at any time. Thereby, 
the bonds and dependencies between patron and employee, buyer and 
seller, became looser. Money was - for those who disposed of it - a 
vehicle of social autonomy.
It may be doubted, however, whether coined money was conceived of 
as a weapon in the struggle of the middle classes against the traditional 
elite. For it seems to be a rather modern and theoretical idea that this 
struggle was consciously and intentionally fought as a battle of eco­
nomic systems. In fact, if one of the basic functions of coined money is 
its capacity for storing wealth, then this new economic instrument 
served the purposes of the prosperous elite very well. On the whole, 
the leading classes were always successful in adapting themselves to new 
social and economic situations, exploiting new means of cultural prac­
tice, putting themselves at the head of new developments, and thereby 
maintaining, defending and even strengthening their social position. 
They will have played a leading role in the introduction of coined 
money.
Compared with pre-monetary objects of value, like tripods or spits, 
not to speak of cattle, coined money had several advantages. It consisted 
of precious metal, rarely gold, mostly silver, both of which had hitherto 
been an exclusive exchange property of the elite: this must have granted 
a certain confidence in the new currency. But unlike pieces of metal, 
which were necessarily of uncertain weight and purity and had to be 
controlled in every transaction, coins were given a standardized form 
and a conventional value. This change from intrinsic to socially con­
ferred values was the decisive phenomenon in the genesis of money.
The value of coins lay somewhat above bullion value, which means 
that it was fixed by convention.21 This was on the one hand an advan­
tage, since it prevented coins from being converted into bullion. On the 
other hand, however, this must have created problems, since for their 
reduced metal value their recognition was at risk: therefore, the 
convention of coins’ value had to be guaranteed by some “public” 
authority. If certain goods or labors were to be paid with coins, this 
21 See J. H. Kroll, “Silver in Solon’s Law,” in: R. Ashton and S. Hurter (eds.), 
Studies in Greek Numismatics in Memory of Martin Jessop Price, London: 
SPINK 1998, 231.
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presupposes a market, accessible to everybody, where the acceptance of 
coins was granted and where coined money could be converted into 
commodities for everyday life. How was collective confidence to be 
achieved in a value which so evidently was based on pure convention? 
The crucial point in this cannot have been the purity and the weight of 
the metal, since this was difficult to control (and moreover would have 
made the grant useless), but the certainty that the coin would be taken 
back by the issuing authority. Here again, the institutional weakness of 
Greek city-states turned out to be a strength. In the absence of strong 
central powers like monarchies or mighty priesthoods, there was no 
independent authority which could grant the value of coinage to the 
community of its users - except the community itself. It is the commun­
ity of citizens that assures itself and others of the validity of its coins, by 
images and inscription, typically in the genitive plural: e.g. (coin) “of the 
Syracusians”. Paradoxically, this is precisely where the force of the 
whole concept seems to lie: since it was the same community that on 
the one hand fixed and on the other hand acknowledged and accepted 
the coinages’ value, this was a highly stable system.
In this sense, the introduction of coinage, first of all, served civic 
communities to accomplish their communitarian enterprises and to 
facilitate their economic communication, in particular within their 
own realm, but also beyond in economically dynamic city-states. It 
was the result of a far-reaching process of depersonalization and decen­
tralization, by which all participants of economic transactions were 
freed from hierarchically imposed authorities and long-term depend­
encies, through which they became equal partners, acting in immediate 
independent exchange. The trustworthiness of this system was based on 
a high degree of social coherence and reciprocity, insofar as coined 
money was an important step towards and a firm element of an egali­
tarian civic society.
Roots of this kind of community sense have been convincingly seen in 
sacrificial rituals.22 Sacrificial meals at the great polis festivals were 
occasions of egalitarian division of meat among all citizens, who con­
stituted the polis’ central sacrificial community. Such sacrifices had to be 
paid for by the community, with equal contributions, which then were 
converted into equal distributions. For that purpose, too, a currency of 
equal units was very useful. That the origins of money are indeed 
Seaford, Money and the Early Greek Mind, 48-67.22
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connected with the sphere of sacrifice becomes clear from the name of 
the most common coin, obolos, originally meaning the spit used for 
sacrificial meat consumption. Indeed, the great political reformer and 
poet Solon, who fixed the sacrificial calendar of his mother-city Athens, 
also determined prices of victims for public sacrifices. Thus, sacrifice 
seems to have been “an early agent of monetization”.23 From these 
origins, temples became the main places for storage of a city’s treasures. 
An impressive inscription from the temple of Artemis at Ephesos 
records silver and gold coming from various sources: “from the 
polis”, “from the wood”, “from here”, “from the naval”, “from the 
salt”, etc.24 Thus, temples became places of egalitarian, communal 
distribution for religious, political and other communitarian purposes.
23 Seaford, Money and the Early Greek Mind, 75-87; R. Parker, Athenian Religion, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press 1996, 43-55; Kroll, “Silver in Solon’s Law,” 225-32.
24 Inschriften von Ephesos I (1979), Nr. 1.
25 Plato, Republic 371b; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1133b.
Even more, and to an amazing degree, the fully developed democracy 
of classical Athens was based on money: law courts in which thousands 
of members were involved every day, citizens’ assemblies which gath­
ered on average every ninth day, and many other institutions were paid 
in order to make participation possible for all citizens.
In this sense, Plato and Aristotle consider trade and money funda­
ments of communitarian life. Money makes things commensurable and 
thus promotes exchange and community, koinonia.25
This community, at least in its first phases, above all was the com­
munity of the individual polis citizens. As we saw, coins were first 
primarily designed and used for payment and exchange within the 
issuing state’s territory. This was enhanced by the fact that many cities 
used their own weight standards, which must have considerably 
impeded conversion. On the other hand, this fact must have led to the 
result that the citizens considered “their” coinage as their own property. 
It was their collective good, and it was their own responsibility that 
granted this good’s reliability and stability. In fact - if we don’t ask for 
specific intentions but for general implications - coinage could become 
a sign of the city’s self-assertion and a symbol of its identity. Not as a 
political propaganda message, but as a sign of the community’s rich­
ness, distributed and floating among individual owners.
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Structural implications
Beyond the immediate intentions and purposes of the introduction of 
coined money there occurred some basic structural changes inherent in 
the process of monetization in early Greece which cannot, from the 
beginning and in every respect, have been obvious to its participants, 
but became implicitly efficient in the course of time. In the form of 
coinage, the accumulation of wealth tended to become an end in itself, 
independent of former social interrelations. Certainly, this is not a 
substantialistic quality of coinage as such, implying necessary conse­
quences in social behavior.26 Like all cultural goods, coined money 
attained its significance via changing cultural practice: on the one 
hand money could be used to create and ensure social connections, 
and on the other hand the accumulation of wealth could also become 
an autonomous practice without, and before the introduction of, coin­
age. Nevertheless, coined money had some qualities and aspects that 
might at least have served such tendencies.27
26 This is particularly stressed by von Reden, Exchange in Ancient Greece, 
171-216. See also Papadopoulos, “Minting Identify: Coinage, Ideology and the 
Economics of Colonization in Akhaian Magna Graecia,” 39.
27 With what follows, compare Seaford, Money and the Early Greek Mind, 147-72, 
with substantialistic tendencies.
Whereas the traditional exchange of goods and gifts had been a 
specific act, confined to specific occasions, effectuated through specific 
objects with specific symbolic meanings for specific purposes, particu­
larly for creating personal bonds and relations between the donor and 
the receiver of the object, money more-or-less excluded such symbolic 
values. Exchange on the basis of money was universal: money had no 
special purpose, it could be applied to all things, to all subjects, in all 
contexts. Consciously or unconsciously, this was in various respects a 
far-reaching process of abstraction.
First: Transactions on a monetary basis tended to be basically 
non-personal: whereas gifts are personal acts directed to personal 
addressees, commodities may be bought from and sold to anyone. 
Gifts, being not immediately compensated by counter-gifts, create 
long-term obligations; goods, being exchanged on the basis of trust­
worthiness, presuppose long-term relations; while acquisition by and 
sale for money do not create any specific relationship between the 
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respective actors - on the contrary, payment by money, as an immediate 
compensation of a debt, terminates any such interrelation.
Second: Whereas the exchange of gifts is effectuated with things and 
activities of specific cultural or psychological valor, money does not 
allow for measuring the price of things that are at one’s heart or have a 
personal significance - on the contrary, money constitutes a measure 
that applies to all objects and actions of human life alike. The most 
varied of things are deprived of their specific emotional or symbolic 
qualities and character by measuring and evaluating them according to 
their monetary value.
Third: This reduction and neutralization of individual persons to 
subjects and of things to objects is made possible by a general and 
neutral measure of value. Representing conventionally fixed values, 
and therefore being of no concrete use, money is the clearest expression, 
and at the same time the most effective promoter, of a specific kind of 
abstract thinking - which concerns not only the economy, but the whole 
society with its specific concepts of man, social values, and social 
interaction.
Fourth: A decisive new step consisted in extrapolating this value from 
the objects into a medium of its own. Whereas formerly value was 
inherent in valuable objects, now it became an autonomous system. 
This does not mean to deny preliminary stages of this development, e.g. 
silver bullion or spits used as currency; but it was only in the form of 
coined money that “value” became a system with its own, self-regulating 
rules. In principle, this has not changed even in the present development 
towards a moneyless credit economy where mere numbers like the Dax or 
the Dow Jones have taken over the function of an autonomous value 
system. Anyway, this is the precondition under which money could be 
valued as an autonomous factor of social development and social crisis.
Without any doubt, the introduction of coinage was a great intellec­
tual and cultural achievement. As we have seen, a similar kind of 
rational thinking underlies the design of newly founded cities and 
their territories. Moreover, as has been acutely observed, pre-Socratic 
philosophy, with its reduction of the multiplicity of existing things to a 
unique principle, like water, corresponds closely with the abstract con­
cept underlying the monetization of early Greek economy.28
28 Seaford, Money and the Early Greek Mind, 175-291, with stimulating 
exaggerations.
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Homogenization of persons and objects, universality and pervasive­
ness of coins and money: these were achievements that could be con­
ceived, and were in fact evaluated, as progress towards social equality, 
justice, and free communication. However, as we shall see, the same 
phenomena also became the goals of sharp criticism.
An unconscious consequence of this development was the fact that 
the exchange of goods among men became fundamentally different 
from the exchange of reciprocal support between men and gods. 
Whereas the religious relationship of mortal men to their gods remained 
a long-term connection based on the principle of gift exchange, vener­
ation and benevolence, the market of money-based trade and short­
term exchange obeyed totally different rules which essentially belonged 
to the human world. It is true that some Greek sanctuaries, with their 
accumulating wealth, adopted functions of banking on a monetary 
basis; but these economic activities were a game with different rules 
than the religious interactions between men and gods through tradi­
tional votive-offerings.
Images
A specific quality of coins, which in antiquity was exploited even more 
than today, resulted from the combination of two of its features.
First: Coins were authorized by political units, states or rulers; they 
embodied their authorities, in a sense. This becomes particularly 
obvious in the marks of authentication they are distinguished by. The 
authority that issued money as today, made itself “present” on its coins, 
by inscriptions and images. Such images are highly interesting testimo­
nies of how ancient cities and states aimed to present themselves within 
their own realms as well as towards the external world. These are 
images of political identity.
Second: Coins were an official medium with the widest diffusion 
conceivable. The routes of internal exchange and external trade became 
routes of coins, and by implication, routes of presence of those states by 
which these coins had been issued. In a world without mass media, coins 
were a uniquely ubiquitous means of official self-presentation through 
images.
The choice of a motif of “identity” implied two perspectives: towards 
the interior and towards the exterior. Regarding the home city, a motif 
had to be found that was acknowledged by the whole community; 
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regarding the surrounding world, this motif had to define the home city 
in relation to other cities, either by distinction or by assimilation.
Archaic and classical Greek city-states
The first phase of Greek coin issuing was shaped by the competitive 
situation within and among the countless larger and smaller city-states. 
Images, being the most conspicuous features of coins, were used on the 
one hand in order to visualize an individual polis identity, and on the 
other to signal distinction as well as interconnections among various 
city-states.
Most cities relied on gods to whom they reserved the obverse side of 
their coins, while the reverse side was often decorated by some other 
characteristic motif, symbol, or other. On principle, this must have been 
intended to put the city’s money under divine protection. How these 
decisions were taken can only be guessed at. In Athens the choice of the 
city’s name-goddess Athena on the obverse and of the goddess’s owl on 
the reverse was probably uncontroversial. Normally, however, Greek 
cities had not one major “city-god(dess)” but many gods and goddesses 
of public importance; therefore they had to decide to which god they were 
to entrust their money. In Syracuse, for example, Apollo and Athena had 
old temples in the city centre; for what reason the local nymph-goddess 
Arethusa was chosen to adorn the city’s lavish coins - perhaps as a 
compromise between different groups - is a matter of pure speculation.29
29 See the complicated explanation given by E. Boehringer, Die Miinzen von
Syrakus, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1929, 95-102.
30 Papadopoulos, Money and the Early Greek Mind, 28-39, with whom, however, I 
do not agree regarding possible references to Bronze Age traditions.
31 S. Ritter, Bildkontakte: Gotter und Heroen in der Bildsprache griechischer
Miinzen des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr., Berlin: Reimer 2002.
Other cities had symbols of their wealth on their coins: thus, Sybaris 
issued with a bull and Metapontion with a corn-ear, documenting 
agricultural richness, while Kroton had a tripod, perhaps indicating 
access to mineral resources and metal industry.30 But again, we will 
never know how much these motifs were contested by groups other 
than the rich landowners or metal merchants.
Besides the city’s internal identity, there were the relations to the 
surrounding world.31 A city might choose a deity who was present on 
an allied city’s coins, thus expressing positive political relations; or a 
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deity of an adversary city, indicating political opposition. Accordingly, 
the choice of the same deity could demonstrate alliance as well as 
opposition. Athens created for her coins a new type of Athena with an 
open, so-called “attic” helmet, while soon afterwards her great eco­
nomic rival Corinth also chose Athena, but with a closed, so-called 
“Corinthian” helmet, pushed backwards over her forehead. That this 
is not a negligible detail is shown by the fact that later the Athenian 
daughter-city Thurioi and the Athenian ally Neapolis took over the 
Athenian version of Athena, while the Corinthian daughter-cities 
Leukas and Ambrakia followed the Corinthian version. Political affili­
ations were expressed through the assimilation of coin images. On the 
other hand, a blatant example of polemic reception is given by Syracuse, 
after the glorious defeat of the Athenian fleet (413 bc), through a new 
series of splendid silver coins where the traditional version of Arethusa 
is changed into a spectacular representation of Athena - with an 
Athenian-type helmet! Thus, the images of a city’s gods or goddesses 
were received and imitated by political allies and friends, opposed by 
political rivals, and “occupied” by political enemies.
Hellenistic monarchies
The rulers of the great Hellenistic monarchies made extensive use of 
coins in order to make themselves “present” through their vast empires. 
Alexander the Great in many places of his realm, from Greece and 
Macedonia to Alexandria, Beirut and Babylon, installed highly efficient 
mints producing a unified currency, authorized in the king’s name: 
silver coins with his alleged father, Zeus, on the obverse and his ances­
tor, Herakles, on the reverse, and gold coins with his tutelary goddess, 
Athena, and the victory goddess, Nike. This was probably Alexander’s 
most far-reaching measure in order to unify his immense empire with its 
extremely heterogeneous political and cultural traditions: coined money 
allowed and encouraged boundless economic communication, and the 
coins’ images testified to the ubiquitous “presence” of the ruler who 
granted the trustworthiness of material value. This communicative 
force of circulating coinage must have been particularly efficient in the 
newly conquered lands of the former Persian Empire, east from Asia 
Minor and Phoenicia, where coined money was hitherto practically 
unknown. Thus, the gods of the new ruler circulated on the coins in 
the contexts of new forms of trade.
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Alexander’s successors, the rulers over the great empires of the 
Hellenistic age, even put their own images on the coins: these became 
the most obvious demonstration that the king, in the form of “his” 
money, was efficiently present in all parts of his realm and permeated 
the life of all his subjects.
Roman Republic
These possibilities of coins were exploited to an extreme degree in 
ancient Rome.32 During the Roman Republic, images of gods and 
goddesses testify to the various goals images could serve. As a norm, 
coin values were distinguished by different gods: the denarius, the main 
coin, was marked by the goddess Roma, the quinarius by Hercules, the 
as by lanus, and so forth. Thus, the system of coinage was visualized 
with a stable constellation of gods and goddesses. On principle, this 
multifaceted stability corresponded to the “system” of coin images of 
Hellenistic monarchies.
32 The whole repertoire is readily accessible, with commentaries, in
M. H. Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, Cambridge University Press 1974.
33 M. H. Crawford, Coinage and Money under the Roman Republic, London:
Methuen 1985, 116-32.
Nevertheless, when Roman armies conquered Greece and installed 
Roman rule from the second century bc, this was not followed by an 
expansion of Roman money:33 finds of Roman coins from the period of 
the republic are rare in Greece. This does not imply that Rome did not 
interfere in the economic system of the conquered East. The first victor­
ious general, T. Quinctius Flamininus, probably stopped the circula­
tion of coins of Macedonia, Rome’s immediate enemy, but a little later 
Rome accepted and promoted a powerful local coinage, the Athenian 
“new style silver coins”. A similar situation is to be observed in other 
parts of the Eastern Mediterranean that had come under Roman rule. 
And even in Spain where the use of coinage had formerly been very 
restricted, the Roman conquest of the second century bc did not entail a 
wide diffusion of Roman money; towards the middle of the century, 
Rome even initiated a local coinage, based on the Roman weight 
system, but with local images. Obviously, the truly Roman denarius 
and as system, with its characteristic imagery, was mainly destined for 
circulation and comprehension within the realm of the capital and Italy.
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During the last century of the Roman Republic, this relatively stable 
system of coin images was rapidly changed into an extremely flexible 
instrument for political messages.34 The struggle of mighty army 
commanders for political power and the ensuing competition for social 
prestige within the upper classes resulted in an increasing public dem­
onstration of personal claims and achievements in all realms of life. For 
this purpose, coins were a particularly efficient medium. Although the 
office of the three magistrates responsible for coin issuing was a rather 
low rung at the beginning of a political career, moneyers used coins for 
highly specific political messages: either promoting their own interests 
and careers, by depictions of their political activities, legislation, organ­
ization of public games, erecting public buildings, and so forth; or by 
glorifying and supporting one of the great protagonists of political life, 
the triumph of Marius, or the symbols of charismatic world-rule of 
Julius Caesar. To this end, a most complex imagery of political themes, 
allegories, and symbols was created, through which coins became a 
medium of a widely dispersed political discourse. Finally, Julius 
Caesar was given the right to put his own portrait on his coins, as 
Hellenistic kings used to do.
34 A. Alfoldi, “The Main Aspects of Political Propaganda on the Coinage of the
Roman Republic,” in: R. A. G. Carson and C. H. V. Sutherland (eds.), Essays in 
Roman Coinage presented to Harold Mattingly, Oxford University Press 1956, 
63-95; Crawford, Coinage and Money under the Roman Republic, 712-44; 
T. Holscher, “Die Bedeutung der Miinzen fur das Verstandnis der politischen 
Reprasentationskunst der spaten romischen Republik,” in: T. Hackens and 
R. Weiller (eds.), Actes du 9eme congres international de numismatique, Bern 
1979, Louvain-la-Neuve: Association Internationale des Numismates 
Professionels 1982, 269-82.
Scholars like to speak of this practice as “propaganda” - which, 
however, implies some misleading connotations. The images as such 
are in part not very clear, difficult to understand, and therefore lacking 
the self-explaining evidence and convincing power that is to be expected 
from “propaganda”. And regarding the users of money, one may doubt 
whether they normally studied coin images with such intensity that they 
might be influenced by them in their political positions. More adequate 
are the notions of “self-assertion” and “claim”. Impressing one’s own 
figurative motif and script on the public medium of coinage means to 
occupy this medium for a symbol of one’s own person and thus impos­
ing one’s own claims by forcing the community to acknowledge this 
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self-assertion. In this sense, the distribution of coinage within the polit­
ical community makes these images and their implied claims universally 
present.
Roman Empire
The Roman emperors monopolized this unique medium of political 
publicity. With great iconographic skill whole programs were dis­
played, changing according to the vicissitudes of historical events and 
the ideological and mental moves of the time: the emperor’s heroic 
feats, in particular military campaigns and triumphs; his significant 
political acts, like public sacrifices, distribution of money, speeches to 
the army; personifications of his ideological issues, like Virtus, Pietas, 
Concordia, Fides, Felicitas, and so forth. By this example, coins became 
a most manifold panel of imperial policy.35
35 Coins of the Roman Empire in the British Museum I (1923)-VI (1962);
C. H. V. Sutherland, Coinage in Roman Imperial Policy 31 B.C.-68 A.D., 
London: Methuen 1951.
Even here the term of “political propaganda” is misleading. 
Certainly, there was no central institution for steering public opinions; 
nor was there any aim of ideological infiltration in the sense of Christian 
mission (from where the term “propaganda” is derived: propaganda 
fide) or even of modern dictatorial regimes, addressing potential oppo­
nents. More appropriately, we might speak of panegyric exaltation 
aiming at creating an atmosphere of general consent. Much more 
interesting, however, and highly debated, is the problem of the effi­
ciency of this medium. Were coins intensely observed? Were their 
messages eagerly received, enthusiastically or critically interpreted and 
commented on? By whom? With what results? Leading to what kind of 
reactions? All this would be a matter of high-level theory about low- 
level political communication, which is an important task for future 
interdisciplinary research between art history, political science, and 
semiotics: a theory which would have to consider on the one hand the 
extraordinarily complex imagery of the emperor’s and the state’s polit­
ical presence in this medium, and on the other hand the normal situa­
tions of low attention in this medium’s use - but always keeping in mind 
that it must have been an efficient medium, as is testified by its endur­
ance through the centuries.
Money and image: presence of the state 133
The consequences of coined money in ancient judgments
Ancient authors, critical authorities, as well as low-level observers and 
participants in economic life, were well aware of the great changes, in 
part revolutionary in part structural and processual, that were implied 
by the introduction of money: with consequences that not only con­
cerned the economy, but in many respects deeply affected social, 
cultural, and even religious life, attitudes, and mentality.
Homer, the great representative poet of “heroic” values in a world of 
the emerging polis, marginalized the world of trade although this was 
one of the seminal factors of his time. Nevertheless, his hero, Achilleus, 
defends, in a symptomatic way, the values of his “self”, his “psyche”, 
against the tempting offers of wealth: when Agamemnon takes away his 
maiden who had been given to him as a reward for his bravery in battle 
and who thus was the sign of his time, his social excellence, he resisted 
all compensation, saying that no wealth could ever have so much value 
as his psyche, his personal “self”.36
36 Homer, Iliad 9, 401 ff.
37 Seaford, Money and the Early Greek Mind, 147-72. 38 Ibid., 157-65.
Aischylos, Agamemnon 438.
From that time, there emerges a broad tradition of far-reaching 
criticism of wealth in Greek literature, particularly of its universal and 
pervasive character, which undoubtedly implies coined money.37 This 
criticism is to be seen in the horizon of a society in which property was in 
fact the undisputed basis of social rank, even in the periods of the most 
radical form of Athenian democracy. Against this background, such 
criticism may seem at first sight somewhat hypocritical, but on the other 
hand it is this horizon which gives criticism of wealth its sharpness.
Money acquires everything. For money one can have beauty, health, 
noble birth (by paying the dowry for a noble bride), the favor of gods 
(by acquiring an expensive sacrifice victim), even human beings: pros­
titutes. Ares, the god of war, is a trader, exchanging even corpses for 
wealth.38 Thukydides is particularly bitter: “No currency ever grew up 
among humankind as evil as money: This lays waste even cities, this 
expels men from their homes, this thoroughly teaches and transforms 
good minds of mortals to set themselves to disgraceful acts; it showed 
men how to practice villainies and to know every act of impiety”.39 And 
Sophocles concludes: money creates friends, honor, political power 
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near to tyranny, physical beauty, wise speech, and pleasure even in 
disease.40
40 Sophocles, frg. 88. 41 Aristophanes, Ploutos 189-97.
42 Alkaios, frg. 360.
43 Pythermos: D. L. Page, Poetae Melici Graeci, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1962, nr.
910.
44 Aristophanes, Ploutos 182. 45 Solon, frg. 24.
46 Herodotus 1, 30. On Tellos see also the interesting interpretation by L. Kurke, 
“The Economy of Kudos," in: C. Dougherty and L. Kurke (eds.), Cultural Poetics
in Archaic Greece: Cult, Performance, Politics, New York: Oxford University 
Press 1998, 153f.
As a consequence, money becomes a goal in itself. The acquisition of 
tripods has a natural limit set by their use (to boil meat, as gifts, etc.) and 
by the problem of storing them. Equally, according to Aristophanes, the 
purchase of all other goods - sex, bread, music, glory, warfare, and so 
forth - has an end in satiety. But money is accumulated without limits.41 
While commodities are normally sold for money in order to acquire 
other commodities (C - M - C), now money is invested in commodities 
in order to make more money (M - C - M - C - M). And whereas the 
first of these sequences finds a natural end in the acquisition of the 
desired commodity, the second sequence is fundamentally unlimited.
Alkaios, the early archaic poet, already assured: “Man is wealth”.42 
Not much later, the poet Pythermos says: “All other things than gold 
were nothing”.43 Still more radically, Aristophanes concludes: Wealth 
“is the unique source of all things, good as well as bad”.44
However, the position of Achilleus in Homer was not forgotten. 
Solon, who had already created a new class-system on the basis of 
property, insists that there are limits to the desirability of wealth.45 
The myth of Midas who miraculously transformed everything he 
touched into gold, but almost starved to death because his food was 
transformed too, was a popular warning. The same Solon, when he was 
asked by Kroisos, the richest king of his age, about the happiest of men, 
is reported to have surprised his partner by not naming Kroisos because 
of his immense riches, but a certain Tellos of Athens who had lived in a 
prosperous city, was the father of noble sons, saw children born to all of 
them, and having had as much wealth as a man may “among us”, 
crowned his life with glorious death in war for his fatherland, for 
which he was given the great honour of a public burial.46 This text is 
particularly interesting because it does not create a fundamental 
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antithesis between material riches and ethical values, but acknowledges 
moderate wealth, together with a thriving family, as a prerequisite of 
happiness; indeed, Tellos was a member of the Athenian upper class 
which defined its rank through its material property and its ensuing 
freedom from physical labor. But this wealth is neither excessive nor 
competitive, it keeps within the norms that prevail “among us”. And, 
above all, as a measure of happiness it is superseded by merits for the 
fatherland, in opposition to the false self-evidence of material riches.
Later, in tragedy, it is frequently asserted which goods and values are 
never and under no condition to be submitted to the power of wealth 
and money: a trouble-free life, a good wife, a genuine friend, the father- 
land, wisdom; on the other hand, essential goods cannot be acquired by 
money: youth, peace, virtue.47
47 Aischylos, Hiketidai 935; Persai 842; Euripides, Alkestis 56-9; Elektra 941;
Herakles 643-8; Ion 629-31; Medeia 598-9; Phoinissai 552—4. Seaford, Money 
and the Early Greek Mind, 162, with further testimonies.
48 M. Welker, “Ab heute regiert Geld die Welt: Die Einfiihrung der 
Geldwirtschaft und ihre Auswirkungen auf religioses Denken und ethische 
Orientierung,” in: C. Gestrich (ed.), Gott, Geld und Gabe, Berlin: Wichern 
Verlag 2004, 52-66.
Conclusion
From what we have seen, it becomes evident that Michael Welker’s 
distinction between such commodities that may and should be submit­
ted to the mechanisms of money and market, and such values that 
should be excluded from the dynamics economy,48 has explicit prece­
dents in ancient Greece. There is no question that a certain measure of 
prosperity and property is a desirable fundamental of human happiness. 
But there are two basic limitations to accumulating riches: first, the 
acquisition of wealth should not become an end in itself, obeying only 
an autonomous market’s rules; and second, wealth should not be 
acquired at the costs of essential goods and values of human societies 
and individuals.
From this, one might deduce a proposal for the problems of the 
present: a project of anthropological research on how much wealth an 
individual person can - anthropologically - use and exploit for his own 
and his relatives’ physical subsistence and moreover for their physical, 
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intellectual, and ethical pleasure.49 What should be opposed is the 
function of wealth as a symbol of social status, since this is the starting 
point of an abstract valuation of money as an end in itself. By such an 
investigation, it might be possible to fix a scientifically founded and 
socially acceptable maximum limit of personal wealth. If a project of 
this kind were installed by political authorities and realized by inde­
pendent scholars of international renown, there might be a chance for 
transferring its results to the realm of public policy. Perhaps the author­
ity of respectable ancient authors helps to make this proposal less naive 
than it might appear to modern finance politicians.
49 An attempt in this direction is made in the Report: Churches Addressing 
Greed: The Work of the Greed Line Study Group of the World Council of 
Churches (WCC), not yet available (draft made available to me by Ulrich 
Duchrow).
